Introduction of Videotaping of Interrogations and the Lessons of the Imaichi Case: A Case of Conventional Criminal Justice Policy-Making in Japan by Miyazawa, Setsuo & Hirayama, Mari
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 27 
Number 1 East Asian Court Reform on Trial 
12-1-2017 
Introduction of Videotaping of Interrogations and the Lessons of 
the Imaichi Case: A Case of Conventional Criminal Justice Policy-
Making in Japan 
Setsuo Miyazawa 
Mari Hirayama 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Setsuo Miyazawa & Mari Hirayama, Introduction of Videotaping of Interrogations and the Lessons of the 
Imaichi Case: A Case of Conventional Criminal Justice Policy-Making in Japan, 27 Wash. L. Rev. 149 
(2017). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol27/iss1/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Compilation © 2017 Washington International Law Journal Association 
 
INTRODUCTION OF VIDEOTAPING OF 
INTERROGATIONS AND THE LESSONS OF THE 
IMAICHI CASE: A CASE OF CONVENTIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY-MAKING IN JAPAN 
 
Setsuo Miyazawa and Mari Hirayama† 
 
Abstract:  Malcolm M. Feeley examined cases of criminal justice reform in the 
United States, where reforms can be conceived and initiated in a very open structure, but 
implementation of the introduced reforms can be handed over to highly fragmented 
implementers.  The story of mandatory videotaping of interrogations and accompanying 
changes in Japan demonstrates the reform process at the other end of the scale, where the 
members of the criminal justice establishment can exert a strong influence even at the 
conception and initiation stages, and have even stronger control at the implementation 
and routinization stages.  We believe that Feeley’s theoretical framework can be 
expanded to be more generally applicable to court reforms outside the United States.  
This could be achieved by introducing the degree of openness of the policy-making 
process at the conceptualization and initiation stages, and by introducing a degree of 
fragmentation of the policy-making process at the implementation and routinization 
stages as central independent variables which determine the course of the reform. 
Cite as: Setsuo Miyazawa and Mari Hirayama, Introduction of Videotaping of 
Interrogations and the Lessons of the Imaichi Case: A Case of Conventional Criminal 
Justice Policy-Making in Japan, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 149 (2017). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Malcolm M. Feeley’s Analysis of Court Reforms in the United 
States and the Purpose of This Paper 
 
In 1983, Malcolm M. Feeley published a seminal book on criminal 
court reforms in the United States, Court Reform on Trial: Why Simple 
Solutions Fail.1  According to Feeley, the primary problem with American 
courts is that “the courts themselves have . . . fostered unrealistic 
expectations, and promoted bold but often empty solutions.” 2   Such 
problems arise due to changes caused by raised standards and increased 
                                                 
†  Setsuo Miyazawa is a Professor Emeritus at Kobe University, a Senior Professor of Law at the 
University of California Hastings College of the Law, and the Senior Director of the East Asian Legal 
Studies Program at the University of California Hastings College of the Law. He received an LL.B., LL.M., 
and S.J.D. from Hokkaido University, as well as an M.A., M.Phil., and Ph.D. in sociology from Yale 
University. Mari Hirayama is a Professor of Law at Hakuoh University Faculty of Law. She received an 
LL.B. from Ritsumeikan University, an LL.M. from Kwansei Gakuin University, and an LL.M. from the 
University of Minnesota. The authors are grateful for the patience and editorial assistance of the editors of 
the Washington International Law Journal. 
1  MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL (1983). 
2  Id. at xiii. 
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attention from politicians, the press, and the scholarly community.  Even 
when these changes produce significant achievements, they often result in 
disillusionment and disappointment.  Feeley emphasizes fragmentation as 
the American courts’ most visible and natural quality.3  The American 
courts are arenas in which a range of competing and conflicting interests 
collide.  Accordingly, this fragmentation appears to make coherent 
implementation of introduced reforms particularly difficult.  Planned 
changes often fail because innovators do not understand these characteristics 
of the court.  Feeley identified the following five stages of planned change: 
1) diagnosis or conception; 2) initiation; 3) implementation; 4) 
routinization; and 5) evaluation.4  In the four cases Feeley analyzed, 
fragmentation seems to have worked most strongly at the stages of 
implementation and routinization.  In those stages, fragmentation produced 
a result contrary to that expected by those who had diagnosed the status quo 
and initiated the given reform. 
 
What was Feeley’s solution for reforming the American courts? 
Instead of bold reforms conceived and initiated from outside the judiciary, 
he essentially proposed to let the courts introduce reforms by themselves 
through the course of litigation.  Feeley argued that litigation is well suited 
to pursue changes in complex institutions because “[i]t is problem 
specific[,] . . . [i]t is ameliorative[,] . . . [i]t is incremental[,] . . . and 
litigation is relatively inexpensive.”5  This argument reminds the readers of 
his later research on prison reforms through judicial decisions.6 
 
At the time of its publication, Feeley’s book was considered “one of 
the best statements of the policy science . . . tradition within the sociology of 
law.”7  It has continued to inspire research on various areas of court reform 
in the United States until today.8  Given its prominence within research on 
American court reforms, one may be tempted to try to expand this argument 
to a more universally applicable framework on court reform.  East Asian 
                                                 
3  Id. at 9–10. 
4  Id. at 35–37. 
5  Id. at 214. 
6  See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
MODERN STATE: HOW COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998). 
7  Austin Sarat, Courts and Court Reform: Which Appearances Are the Most Deceiving?, 8 ALSA F. 
454, 458 (1984) (review of FEELEY, supra note 1).  
8  Most recent examples include Alissa Pollitz Worden et al., Court Reform: Why Simple Solutions 
Might Not Fail? A Case Study of Implementation of Counsel at First Appearance, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
521 (2017). The authors of this paper state that, “[w]e frame our inquiry around Malcolm Feeley’s thesis 
that court reforms are more likely to fail than to succeed, and draw conclusions about the conditions under 
which such reforms are likely to be successful.” Id. at 522. 
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countries can provide cases for such an expansion because many reforms 
have been recently introduced there.9  Japan is no exception.10 
 
Our research in Japan suggests three main areas of expansion of 
Feeley’s theoretical framework.  The first point of expansion concerns the 
stages of diagnosis or conception and initiation.  While Feeley’s analysis 
suggests that idealistic expectations of reform outside the court system can 
often have a strong influence at these stages in the United States, the 
policy-making process in Japan is likely to be far more closed.  Those who 
have worked in the existing court system can also often prevent the 
influence of idealistic reforms outside the court system.  Reforms 
conceptualized and initiated in such a system may be far less idealistic, and 
remain within the boundary acceptable to those who have been working in 
the existing system.  Therefore, it seems necessary to add the degree of 
openness within the policy-making process at the stages of diagnosis or 
conception and initiation as a new variable to Feeley’s analytical 
framework. 
 
The second point of expansion of Feeley’s framework concerns the 
stages of implementation, routinization, and evaluation.  Feeley’s analysis 
suggests that the highly fragmented nature of the American courts often 
makes faithful implementation of idealistic reforms difficult if they are 
conceptualized and initiated outside the court system.  Reforms are 
therefore often routinized in ways acceptable and possible under the existing 
conditions of the court system.  Due to this limitation, the evaluation is 
likely a failure from the perspective of idealistic reformers who 
conceptualized and initiated reforms outside the court system.  In Japan, 
the court system is a national bureaucracy in which a majority of judges join 
immediately after completing the apprenticeship period, even though they 
have no experience as practicing attorneys.  These judges remain on the 
bench until the mandatory retirement at the age of 65.11  They are carefully 
                                                 
9 See generally LEGAL INNOVATIONS IN ASIA: JUDICIAL LAWMAKING AND THE INFLUENCE OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW (John O. Haley & Toshiko Takenaka eds., 2014); EAST ASIA’S RENEWED RESPECT FOR 
THE RULE OF LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE FUTURE OF LEGAL AND JUDICIAL LANDSCAPES IN EAST ASIA 
(Setsuo Miyazawa et al. eds., 2015).  
10 See Setsuo Miyazawa, Law Reform, Lawyers, and Access to Justice, in JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW 
39–89 (Gerald Paul McAlinn ed., 2007) [hereinafter Law Reform, Lawyers, and Access to Justice]; Setsuo 
Miyazawa, Successes, Failures, and Remaining Issues of the Justice System Reform in Japan: An 
Introduction to the Symposium Issue, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 313 (2013) [hereinafter Justice 
System Reform in Japan]. See also other articles in the same symposium issue. 
11  For an outline of the Japanese court system, see Setsuo Miyazawa, Introduction: Japan, in 
JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW, supra note 10, at 30–38. 
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appointed, evaluated, relocated, and promoted by the administrative organ 
called the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court.  Since judges’ 
decisions are closely monitored by the General Secretariat, and decisions 
contrary to Supreme Court precedents and mainstream judicial decisions 
negatively impact career trajectories,12 most judges are likely to faithfully 
implement and routinize reforms introduced through the conception and 
initiation stages dominated by members of the existing court system.  The 
evaluation of the result by members of the existing court system is likely to 
be positive, while the evaluation of the result by outside reformers whose 
proposals were totally or largely rejected in the conception and initiation 
stages is likely to be negative.  Accordingly, the degree of fragmentation 
must be considered as a variable during the stages of implementation and 
routinization.  Although the American court system may be highly 
fragmented, the Japanese court system may be highly unfragmented. 
 
The third point for expansion of Feeley’s analytical framework is the 
role of litigation in court reform.  While Feeley found a significant role for 
litigation in prison reform in the United States,13 the same cannot be said 
for Japan.  Litigation is unlikely to play a significant role in Japanese court 
reform because the administrators of the court system react unfavorably to 
judges who challenge the existing system.14  To refute this claim, one may 
consult the 2002 case involving the arrest and punishment of prison guards 
who allegedly used excessive force to subdue inmates in Nagoya Prison.  
This poor treatment served as a catalyst for the eventual amendment of the 
century-old Prison Law.15  However, rather than administrative litigation 
seeking prison reform, this case arose from criminal charges filed by the 
prosecutor seeking punishment of individual guards.  The Ministry of 
Justice had already initiated the amendment of the Prison Law long before 
this case.  The criminal case’s apparent contribution to passing the 
                                                 
12  On the lack of independence of individual judges in Japan, see J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. 
RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003); 
Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control of Japanese Judges, in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC 
COMMUNITY 263–91 (Philip S.C. Lewis ed., 1994) [Administrative Control of Japanese Judges]; Mark A. 
Levin, Civil Justice and the Constitution: Limits on Instrumental Judicial Administration in Japan, 20 PAC. 
RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 265, 265–318 (2010).  
13  See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 6. 
14  See sources cited supra note 12. 
15  See Takuya Asakura, Prison Abuses in Spotlight Following Guard Arrests, JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 13, 
2002, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2002/11/13/national/ 
prison-abuses-in-spotlight-following-guard-arrests; Eric Johnston, Prison Reforms Seen as Too Little, 
and Way Too Late, JAPAN TIMES, June 26, 2007, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2007/06/26/reference/prison-reforms-seen-as-too-little-and-way-too-lat
e/. JAPAN TIMES, an English daily in Japan, is available on the LexisNexis database. 
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amendment was a helpful byproduct rather than the purpose of the litigation.  
Therefore, one should consider the prevalence of litigation seeking to 
reform the existing court and justice system as a variable when analyzing 
the relative merits of differing routes to reform.  Such litigation seems to 
be more widely utilized in the United States than in Japan.  Accordingly, 
the role of litigation may be different between the countries. 
 
The purpose of this Article is limited to the first and second points for 
the expansion of Feeley’s analytical framework.  It will discuss adding a 
degree of openness to the policy-making process during the diagnosis or 
conception and initiation stages and the degree of court system 
fragmentation at the implementation and routinization stages as new 
variables to Feeley’s analytical framework.  This Article will illustrate how 
members of the existing court system can repel the reform proposal from 
outside and transform it into one which would not harm their interests, and 
may even benefit them.  This conclusion is supported by analyzing the 
process of introducing mandatory videotaping of interrogations in Japan, 
which was proposed in May 2016 and will be implemented by June 2019.16  
For the first time in Japanese history, this reform requires police and 
prosecutors to videotape interrogations.  However, legislators managed to 
limit application of this reform to only a tiny proportion of cases.  This 
reform is not about the court system, but rather about the investigation.  
However, the investigation depends heavily on confessions obtained by 
police and prosecutors, and is often considered the most crucial part of the 
entire criminal justice system in Japan.17  This example of the effect of the 
policy-making process on criminal investigations in Japan is an excellent 
illustration of the conventional process of policy-making in criminal justice 
in Japan. 
 
B. Conventional and Extraordinary Policy-Making Processes on 
Criminal Justice in Japan 
It should be noted here that the preceding three articles in this 
symposium on Japan discussed examples of extraordinary policy-making 
                                                 
16  See generally Keiji soshōhō tō no ichibu o kaiseisuru hōritsu [Act Amending Part of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure], Law No. 54 of 2016 (Japan). For the full text of the original proposal submitted by the 
Ministry of Justice on March 13, 2015, and related information, see Keiji soshōhō tō no ichibu o kaiseisuru 
hōritsuan [Bill to Amend Part of the Code of Criminal Procedure], HŌMUSHŌ [MINISTRY JUST.], 
http://www.moj.go.jp/keiji1/keiji14_00103.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
17  See DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 243–75 
(2002). 
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process.18  In ordinary cases, any major reform proposal for the legal 
system is referred by the Justice Minister to the Legislative Deliberation 
Council (“LDC”) (Hosei Shingikai) established under the Justice Ministry.19  
The LDC is divided into several subcommittees.  The Justice Minister 
refers the reform proposal to an appropriate subcommittee, where a majority 
of members are current members of the judicial establishment.  These 
members include the judiciary, the Justice Ministry, and other governmental 
agencies.  Although the membership of these committees is supplemented 
by academics, many of the members share the establishment’s perspectives.  
The Justice Ministry works as the secretariat for the LDC, which prepares 
the agenda and materials for deliberation and even drafts recommendations 
to be presented to the Justice Minister.  The subcommittee’s draft 
recommendations are then presented at a general meeting of the parent LDC 
which authorizes the draft and presents the final recommendation to the 
Justice Minister. 
 
The membership of the LDC subcommittees on criminal justice is 
largely fixed.  For instance, the four most recent subcommittees on 
criminal justice consisted of voting members (iin), non-voting members 
(kanji), and related officials (kankei-kan): 
 
(1) Subcommittee on the lay judge system: four judges,20 six 
Justice Ministry officials, including prosecutors, two executive 
police officers,21 three practicing attorneys, eight academics, 
one member of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau,22 and one 
member of a crime victim assistance organization;23 
 
                                                 
18  Daniel H. Foote, Diversification of the Japanese Judiciary, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 7 (2017); 
Matthew J. Wilson, Assessing the Direct and Indirect Impact of Citizen Participation in Serious Criminal 
Trials in Japan, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 75 (2017); Erik Herber, Victim Participation in Japan, 27 WASH. 
INT’L L.J. 119 (2017). 
19 For the role of shingikai in Japanese politics, see generally FRANK J. SCHWARTZ, ADVICE AND 
CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF CONSULTATION IN JAPAN (1998). 
20  Judges in these subcommittees may include those holding administrative positions in the General 
Secretariat of the Supreme Court. 
21  We use the term “executive police officers” to mean top-ranking police officers who occupy 
policy-making positions at the National Police Agency or the Tokyo Metropolitan Police. 
22  The Cabinet Legislation Bureau reviews draft bills before submission to the Cabinet. See 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 185. 
23  Committee Register, Ministry of Justice, Hōsei shingikai keijihō (saiban’in seido kankei) bukai iin 
tō meibo [Legislative Deliberation Criminal Justice Laws (Lay Judge System) Subcommittee Member List] 
(May 21, 2014), http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000118545.pdf. Please note that membership might 
have changed between the time of writing and publication. 
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(2) Special Subcommittee on the Criminal Justice System in a 
New Era (Shin-Jidai no Keiji Shiho Seido Tokubetsu Bukai): 
three judges, one former judge, eight Justice Ministry officials, 
including prosecutors, one former prosecutor, four executive 
police officers, one former executive police officer, five 
practicing attorneys, eleven academics, one member of the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau, one member of a crime victim 
assistance organization, and five other members;24 
 
(3) Subcommittee on sex offenses: three judges, six Justice 
Ministry officials, including prosecutors, two executive police 
officers, three practicing attorneys, eleven academics, one 
member of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, and one member of 
a crime victim assistance organization;25 
 
(4) Subcommittee on juvenile law: five judges, ten Justice 
Ministry officials, including prosecutors, three executive police 
officers, four practicing attorneys, twelve academics, one 
member of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, one member of a 
crime victim organization, and one member from a 
newspaper.26 
 
These judges, Justice Ministry officials, and executive police officers 
presented perspectives of the mainstream members of the criminal justice 
system in Japan.  Most academics who served on these subcommittees 
were law professors.  Two of them served on three subcommittees each, 
while eight of them served on two subcommittees each.  Together, these 
academics represent the “criminal justice establishment” in Japan.  The 
conventional process of making criminal justice policy in Japan is 
dominated by this establishment. 
 
                                                 
24  Committee Register, Ministry of Justice, Hōsei shingikai shinjidai no keiji shihō seido tokubetsu 
bukai iin tō meibo [Legislative Deliberation Council Criminal Justice System in a New Era Special 
Subcommittee Member List] (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000122717.pdf. This 
subcommittee deliberated on the introduction of mandatory videotaping of interrogations, as will be 
discussed later in this paper. 
25  Committee Register, Ministry of Justice, Hōsei shingikai keijihō (sei hanzai kankei) bukai iin tō 
meibo [Legislative Deliberation Criminal Justice Laws (Sexual Offenses) Subcommittee Member List] 
(May 25, 2016), http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001184600.pdf. 
26  Committee Register, Ministry of Justice, Hōsei shingikai shōnenhō, keijihō (shōnen nenrei, 
hanzaisha shogū kankei) bukai iin tō meibo [Legislative Deliberation Council Juvenile Law, Criminal 
Justice Laws (Juvenile Age, Criminal Treatment) Subcommittee Member List] (Oct. 30, 2017), 
http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001239481.pdf. 
156 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 27 NO. 1 
 
Both the reform of judicial appointment discussed by Daniel H. Foote 
and the introduction of the lay judge system discussed by Matthew J. 
Wilson did not explore this conventional policy-making process.  The 
business community, represented by the Japan Business Federation 
(Keidanren)27— the most powerful interest group working closely with the 
Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”) which had controlled the government for 
most periods since its founding in 1955—demanded that the government 
expand and improve the judiciary and legal profession.  In support of this 
goal, the business community proposed a wide range of reforms in 1998, 
including legal education reform.  Since the Justice Ministry and the 
judiciary were targeted by the demanded reform, the LDP government 
established the Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”) (Shiho Seido 
Kaikaku Shingikai).  Instead of falling under the Justice Ministry, the JSRC 
fell directly under the Cabinet.28  Of the thirteen members, the JSRC had 
only one member each who respectively represented the judiciary, the 
procuracy, and practicing attorneys, so that there were expectations that the 
JSRC and the implementation process which followed would produce 
extensive reforms. 
 
However, members of the existing system often managed to limit 
reform to levels much lower than expected by progressive reformers outside 
the system.  Reform of judicial appointments and the introduction of the 
lay judge system were no exception. 
 
In the case of the appointment of lower court judges, which before 
was handled entirely by the Personnel Bureau of the General Secretariat of 
the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court preempted reforms from outside and 
established a consultative committee which would evaluate judicial 
                                                 
27 See KEIDANREN [JAPAN BUS. FED’N], http://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2017); 
see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 100–05 (explaining the role of Keidanren in Japanese politics in the 
1990s). 
28 For an early observation about the JSRC, see Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Judicial Reform in 
Japan: The Rule of Law at Last?, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 89, 89–121 (2001). For a semi-official 
English translation of the final recommendations presented by the JSRC to the Prime Minister in June 2001, 
see THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council - For 
a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century, PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND HIS CABINET (June 
12, 2001), http://japan.kantei.go.jp/judiciary/2001/0012report.html. For a warning that reforms initiated by 
the JSRC may be further reduced and narrowed through the implementation process which returned to the 
traditional process dominated by members of the existing system, see Law Reform, Lawyers, and Access to 
Justice, supra note 10, at 39–89. For a recent evaluation of the justice system reform initiated by the JSRC, 
see Justice System Reform in Japan, supra note 10, at 313–47. 
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candidates presented by the Personnel Bureau.  The result almost 
completely prevents practicing attorneys from being appointed as judges.29  
 
The lay-judge system seems to have fared better.  More than 95% of 
those who served as lay judges felt it was a worthwhile experience.30  Still, 
the introduced system was much less revolutionary than what reform 
proponents outside the criminal justice establishment wanted.31  While 
outside reformers wanted to democratize the criminal trial system by 
introducing a jury system in order to minimize the involvement of 
professional judges, the JSRC proposed a system in which professional 
judges and lay people worked together.  The JSRC defined the purpose of 
the new system not in terms of the democratization of criminal trials, but in 
terms of promoting public understanding and enhancing public trust in the 
administration of criminal justice.32  The system’s application was limited 
to the most serious types of cases, which accounted for only 2 or 3% of all 
criminal cases. Further, by requiring any decision made by the six lay judges 
be supported by at least one of the three professional judges who decided 
the case, professional judges essentially maintained a veto power.33 
 
The incorporation of victim participation in criminal trials discussed 
by Erik Herber was a more conventional reform effort than the previous two 
cases because it was based on a recommendation by the LDC.34  However, 
it was still an extraordinary case of policy-making because the reform was 
initiated by an organization established by bereaved families of crime 
victims instead of members of the criminal justice establishment.  Crime 
victims, bereaved families, and their representatives obtained far more rights 
                                                 
29 See Takayuki Ii, Japan’s Judicial System May Change, but Its Fundamental Nature Stays Virtually 
the Same? Recent Japanese Reforms on the Judicial Appointment and Evaluation, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 459, 459–74 (2013). 
30 Justice System Reform in Japan, supra note 10, at 341. 
31  For a view from a prominent member of the reform movement outside the criminal justice 
establishment, see Satoru Shinomiya, Adversarial Procedure without a Jury: Is Japan’s System Adversarial, 
Inquisitorial, or Something Else?, in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES 
AND COMPARISONS 114, 114–27 (Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa eds., 2002). Progressive 
reformers like Shinomiya proposed to introduce a jury system exactly like that in the United States or a 
system where lay judges far outnumber professional judges. 
32 See Noboru Yanase, Deliberative Democracy and the Japanese Saiban-in (Lay Judge) Trial 
System, 3 ASIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 327, 330–34 (2016). 
33  For an outline of the system, see Setsuo Miyazawa, Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials in 
Japan: The Saiban-in System and Victim Participation in Japan in International Perspectives, 42 INT’L J. L. 
CRIM. & JUST. 71, 71–82 (2014) [hereinafter Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials in Japan]. 
34  See Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Increasing Punitiveness and the Rising Populism in 
Japanese Criminal Justice Policies, 10 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 47, 47–77 (2008) [hereinafter The Politics of 
Increasing Punitiveness]. 
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than, for example, those making victim impact statements in the United 
States because victims may behave like prosecutors in trials, questioning the 
defendant and recommending a sentence.35  And yet, the system did not 
seriously erode the power of prosecutors.  Rather, the system provided 
prosecutors new resources to buttress their demands for convictions and 
harsher penalties. This was because victim representatives invariably 
demand harsh penalties, most typically the death penalty in homicide 
cases.36  The Justice Ministry continues to appoint members of punitive 
victim organizations to committees on criminal justice and shows no sign of 
abolishing or diminishing the victim participation system within criminal 
trials.37 
 
These cases suggest that even reforms conceptualized and initiated in 
unconventional ways can be implemented and routinized by members of the 
existing system in such a way that they will not significantly affect the 
judicial establishment’s power in countries where it is tightly formed and 
unfragmented—such as Japan.  If so, in cases of policy-making through 
more conventional means in countries like Japan, members of the existing 
system may be able to control the policy-making process more strongly, 
even from the earlier stages of conceptualization and initiation.  The rest of 
this paper will present an analysis of such a case which took place in Japan 
recently. 
 
II. CONVENTIONAL PROCESS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE LEGISLATION IN JAPAN: 
THE CASE OF MANDATORY VIDEOTAPING OF INTERROGATIONS 
 
A. Policy-Making Process of Mandatory Videotaping of 
Interrogations 
 
The case began with a crisis for police and prosecutors.  An arrested 
suspect may be detained for up to twenty-three days for each count he or she 
is charged with in Japan, with the first three days at the discretion of police 
and prosecutors and the following twenty days subject to judicial 
authorization upon a prosecutor’s request.38  Most suspects are detained in 
                                                 
35  See Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials in Japan, supra note 33, at 75. 
36  For an early analysis of lay judge trials where a victim representative participated, see David 
Johnson, Early Returns from Japan’s New Criminal Trials, 36 ASIA-PAC. J. | JAPAN FOCUS 1, 1–15 (2009). 
37 See The Politics of Increasing Punitiveness, supra note 34, at 47–77; See Setsuo Miyazawa, Will 
Penal Populism in Japan Decline?: A Discussion, 33 JAPANESE J. SOC. CRIMINOLOGY 122, 122–35 (2008).  
38 See SETSUO MIYAZAWA, POLICING IN JAPAN: A STUDY ON MAKING CRIME 11–33 (Frank G. 
Bennett, Jr. trans., 1992); JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 22–36. 
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police detention cells (ryuchijo) where interrogators try to obtain a 
confession, as opposed to detention facilities (kochisho) managed by the 
Justice Ministry.39  This system has been criticized as “hostage-taking 
justice” (hitojichi shiho)40 and has been described as a “hot bed” (onsho) of 
false confessions leading to false convictions.  Because defense lawyers 
are not allowed to be present during interrogations, 41  videotaping of 
interrogations was proposed as a remedy by the Japanese Bar and other 
reformers.42 
 
In March 2010, Toshikazu Sugaya, who had been sentenced to 
indefinite imprisonment (life imprisonment with a possibility of parole) for 
murder in 1990, was acquitted by a retrial based on new DNA evidence (the 
“Ashikaga case”).43  Audiotapes of Sugaya’s interrogations by prosecutors 
were found and showed how psychological pressure had been applied to 
press him into making a false confession.44  The Japanese Bar and other 
reformers used this case to bolster their demand for the videotaping of 
interrogations. 
 
In September 2010, Atsuko Muraki—a former head of the Welfare 
Ministry’s Equal Employment, Children, and Families Bureau—was 
acquitted by a trial court of a charge alleging she had issued a fabricated 
certificate that falsely recognized an organization as a group for the disabled 
in order to enable the group to use a postage discount system (the “Muraki 
case”).  Her indictment was based on the pretrial statements of her 
co-defendant given to prosecutors.  But, the court considered the 
possibility that those statements had been made under the pressure of 
                                                 
39  See SETSUO MIYAZAWA, supra note 38, at 21–23; JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 62. 
40 Kazuko Ito, Wrongful Convictions and Recent Criminal Justice Reform in Japan, 80 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1245, 1250 (2012). 
41  See JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 74. 
42  For a recommendation from an American scholar, see Richard A. Leo, Miranda, Confessions, and 
Justice: Lessons for Japan?, in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES AND 
COMPARISONS, supra note 31, at 212–15. 
43 Setsuko Kamiya, All Interrogations Must Be Taped: Sugaya, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 27, 2010, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2010/03/27/national/all-interrogations-must-be-taped-sugaya/#.WcbUp
bpFyc0. 
44  Id. In Japan, arrested and detained suspects may not refuse interrogation itself, although they have 
the right to remain silent. Interrogation will continue as long as they deny allegations. Continuing to deny 
charges for a long period of time in solitary confinement without constant support of an attorney is often 
unbearable. Suspects in such a situation may be tempted to make a false confession simply to escape these 
circumstances without thinking about the consequences. Sugaya described such a psychological process in 
his memoir. TOSHIKAZU SUGAYA, ENZAI: ARU HI WATASHI WA HANNNIN NI SARETA [FALSE CONVICTION: 
ONE DAY, I WAS SUDDENLY MADE A CRIMINAL], 17–23 (2009).  
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leading questions from prosecutors.45  Furthermore, a prosecutor who had 
investigated this case was indicted for tampering with evidence, and his two 
former bosses in the same public prosecutor’s office were indicted46 and 
subsequently convicted of similar charges.  Since they were members of 
the elite Special Investigation Squad (tokusobu) of the Osaka District Public 
Prosecutors Office and Muraki was a prominent female civil servant, the 
case attracted a great deal of attention and further fueled the debate over the 
need for the videotaping of interrogations.47 
 
In May 2011, Shoji Sakurai and Takao Sugiyama, who had been 
sentenced to indefinite imprisonment for a murder-robbery in 1967, were 
acquitted by a retrial (the “Fukawa case”).48  This was the seventh case in 
postwar Japan in which a defendant previously sentenced to death or 
indefinite imprisonment was acquitted in a retrial.  The court pointed out 
the possibility that the investigators had used leading questions while 
interrogating the suspects, increasing the demand for introducing videotapes 
of interrogations. 
 
Meanwhile, the reformist Democratic Party of Japan (“DPJ”) won in 
the Lower House election in September 2009.  Its election manifesto called 
for the videotaping of entire interrogations.  Justice Minister Keiko Chiba 
of the DPJ cabinet tried to introduce a bill based on the election manifesto, 
but Hiroshi Nakai, a member of the same cabinet and the Chairman of the 
National Public Safety Commission, which oversees the National Police 
Agency, opposed it.  Chiba backed down and proposed a “realistic review” 
of the present system, meaning only a limited application of videotaping.49  
Prosecutors led by the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office continued to 
oppose the idea of complete videotaping and, instead started discretionary 
partial videotaping. 50   Chiba created a private advisory body called 
                                                 
45 Indictment under Unjust Scenario, JAPAN TIMES, Sep. 14, 2010, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2010/09/14/editorials/indictment-under-unjust-scenario/#.WcbVf7pF
yc0. 
46 Examine Prosecution Process, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2010/10/23/editorials/examine-prosecution-process/. 
47  Ito, supra note 40, at 1271–73. 
48 Case Highlights Judicial Misdeeds, JAPAN TIMES, May 28, 2011, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2011/05/28/editorials/case-highlights-judicial-misdeeds/. 
49 Why the Investigative Secrecy, JAPAN TIMES, July 24, 2010, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2010/07/24/editorials/why-the-investigative-secrecy/. She simply 
recommended that studies be carried out on limiting the scope of interrogations that must be videotaped. 
50 Half-baked Reform Won’t Cut It, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 5, 2011, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2011/03/05/editorials/half-baked-reform-wont-cut-it/; Minoru 
Mitsutani, Top Prosecutor Opposes Fully Taped Interrogations, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 1, 
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Kensatsu no Arikata Kentokai in Japanese, which literally translates to “The 
Deliberative Committee on How the Prosecution Should Be.”51  This body 
consisted of four practicing attorneys, two former judges, two former public 
prosecutors, and two academics.  Practicing attorneys wanted a broad 
videotaping requirement, while prosecutors opposed it.  Unable to reach a 
consensus, in March 2011, the Kensatsu no Arikata Kentokai presented 
Satsuki Eda, Chiba’s successor as Justice Minister, with a lukewarm 
proposal that merely called for increasing the scope of partial videotaping 
and establishing an in-house inspection team within public prosecutor’s 
offices to check on prosecutorial activities.52  Notably, the proposal only 
addressed prosecutorial interrogations, despite the fact that an 
overwhelming majority of suspects were interrogated by police. 
 
Nevertheless, Eda moved ahead and established the Special 
Subcommittee on the Criminal Justice System in a New Era (Shin-Jidai no 
Keiji Shiho Seido Tokubetsu Bukai) in the LDC in June 2011.53  While 
most members of the Special Subcommittee were members of the criminal 
justice establishment, it also included Atsuko Muraki, of the Muraki case, 
and Masayuki Suo, the Director of the 1997 hit movie “Shall We Dance?” 
as well as the 2007 legal movie “Soredemo Boku wa Yattenai” (I Just Didn’t 
Do It), which is based on the true story of a young man falsely accused of 
groping a young girl on a crowded train.  Suo was nominated by the Japan 
Federation of Bar Association, the national association of practicing 
attorneys, upon request from Justice Minister Eda. 54   Muraki’s 
appointment may have had a similar background. 
 
Although videotaping was the main issue of deliberation, no members 
of the subcommittee were scholars who had studied videotaping, and none 
were psychologists who had studied interrogation.  Instead, the Special 
Subcommittee was dominated by members of the criminal justice 
establishment, including past and current police executives, prosecutors, 
                                                                                                                                                 
2011, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2011/03/01/national/top-prosecutor-opposes-fully-taped-interroga
tions/.  
51  On the use of private advisory bodies by cabinet ministers, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 105–
15. 
52 Insufficient Evidence of Reform, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 11, 2011, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2011/04/11/editorials/insufficient-evidence-of-reform/. 
53 Judicial System Reform, JAPAN TIMES, July 10, 2011, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2011/07/10/editorials/judicial-system-reform/. 
54 MASAYUKI SUO, SOREDEMO BOKU WA KAIGI DE TATAKAU: DOKYUMENTO KEIJI SHIHO KAIKAKU 
[STILL I FIGHT IN THE COMMITTEE: A DOCUMENT ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM] vi (Iwanami Shoten 
2015). Justice Minister Eda came from outside the criminal justice establishment and was working against 
police and prosecutors who were resisting the introduction of mandatory videotaping of interrogations. 
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judges, and conservative academics who had regularly served on LDC 
subcommittees on criminal justice.  Suo writes that he was told by his 
attorney friends that “these members are hopeless.”55 
 
Deliberation in the Special Subcommittee progressed extremely 
slowly under the DPJ cabinet.  The government had changed from the 
more liberal DPJ to the more conservative coalition government of the LDP 
and the Komeito56 as a result of their landslide victory in the Lower House 
election in December 2012.  The Special Subcommittee then submitted an 
interim report to the parent Committee in February of 2013.  The Japan 
Times criticized that “the report appears to have forgotten the most 
important goal: how to prevent false charges from being filed against 
innocent people,” and reported that “opinions in general supported the 
electronic recording of the entire interrogation process.  But panel 
members who formerly served as police officers vehemently opposed the 
idea.”57  The interim report presented two options: (1) to require recording 
of entire interrogations only in cases that must be handled by the lay judge 
system and (2) to give discretion to police and prosecutors.  The second 
option would not change the status quo, and even the first option would only 
apply to about 3% of all reported crimes and would exempt cases like the 
Muraki case. 
 
Deliberation in the Special Subcommittee dragged on one more year 
without a conclusion.  Police and prosecutors continued to oppose 
mandatory recording of interrogations, arguing that it would make 
interrogations more difficult.58  In March 2014, five non-lawyer members, 
including Muraki and Suo, presented an unsuccessful proposal to record 
interrogations for all crimes except minor cases, such as traffic violations.59  
Soon after that, in May 2014, the Justice Ministry presented its own 
proposal to the Special Subcommittee.  It had two proposals regarding the 
videotaping of interrogations: (1) to require both police and prosecutors to 
record entire interrogations in cases that would be handled by the lay judge 
system and (2) to require prosecutors to record entire interrogations only in 
                                                 
55 Id. at 6. 
56 Its name is the same in Japanese and English. See KOMEITO, https://www.komei.or.jp/en/ (last 
visited Aug. 7, 2017). 
57 Reform Panel Pulls its Punches, JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 22, 2013, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/02/22/editorials/reform-panel-pulls-its-punches/. 
58 Transparent Interrogations, JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 13, 2014, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/02/13/editorials/transparent-interrogations/. 
59 Transparency in Interrogations, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 27, 2014, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/03/27/editorials/transparency-in-interrogations/. 
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cases they initiated.  In other words, prosecutors would be required to 
record in a slightly broader range of cases than police. 
 
There were two additional surprises in the Justice Ministry’s proposal.  
One was to increase the number of crimes for which wiretapping was 
allowed from four (drug crimes, gun crimes, group smuggling, and 
organized murders) to fourteen, including but not limited to murder, battery, 
assault, burglary, and the production of child pornography.  The other was 
to introduce a plea-bargaining system that would allow prosecutors to drop 
an indictment in return for incriminating information against another 
person.60  The proposed range of videotaping was very limited, yet it was 
difficult for reformers like Muraki and Suo to reject, because doing so could 
mean that a political opportunity for introducing videotaping of 
interrogations would be lost for the near future.  That was exactly why Suo 
and Muraki accepted the whole package. 61   Although the Special 
Subcommittee quickly decided to expand wiretapping and introduce plea 
bargaining, it only mandated videotaped interrogations in cases to be tried 
by the lay judge system, and provided exemptions in certain instances, such 
as cases in which recording would make it impossible to obtain a 
meaningful confession.62 
 
When the Cabinet presented the bill to amend the Code of Criminal 
Procedure and other related laws to introduce above-mentioned “reforms” to 
the Diet in March 2015, The Japan Times warned that plea bargaining might 
create “more chances for false charges.”63  The Lower House passed the 
bill in August 2015,64 while the Upper House failed to pass it before the end 
                                                 
60 See Masahito Inouye, Witness Immunity and Bargain Justice: A Look at the Japanese Concept of 
the Adversary System, in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES AND 
COMPARISONS, supra note 31, at 173–92; Get Serious on Interrogation Reform, JAPAN TIMES, May 14, 
2014, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/05/13/editorials/get-serious-interrogation-reform/. The 
most influential law professor on the Subcommittee, who was also a member of the parent LDC, had 
written an article about the possibility of introducing plea bargaining into Japan more than ten years earlier.  
61 MASAYUKI SUO, supra note 54, at 199–201. Suo mentions Muraki’s leadership among members 
who wanted a broader range of mandatory videotaping. Id. at 216.  
62 Interrogation Recording Pinched, JAPAN TIMES, July 5, 2014, https:// 
www.japantimes. co.jp/opinion/2014/07/04/editorials/interrogation- recordings-pinched; 
Most Criminal Interrogations to Remain Opaque, JAPAN TIMES, July 3, 2014, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/07/02/national/crime-legal/ 
most-criminal-interrogations-in-japan-will-remain-opaque; Say No to Plea Bargaining, JAPAN TIMES, July 2, 
2014, https://www.japantimes. co.jp/opinion/2014/07/01/editorials/say-plea-bargaining. See also 
MASAYUKI SUO, supra note 54, at 129. Suo considers that the mandatory videotaping will cover only 2 to 
3% of criminal cases. 
63 More Chances of False Charges, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 19, 2015, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/03/18/editorials/chances-false-charges. 
64   Tomohiro Osaki, Lower House Oks Recording of Suspect Questioning, JAPAN TIMES, August 8, 
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of the term of the Diet in September 2015.  However, the Cabinet 
presented the bill again to the Diet in 2016, and the bill was finally passed in 
May of 2016.  The amendments were promulgated in June of 2016 and are 
expected to become effective over the next three years. 
 
This case illustrates that members of the criminal justice 
establishment who dominate the conventional policy-making process can 
limit even reform initiated by a Justice Minister and produce separate 
policies that benefit the criminal justice establishment.  The requirement of 
videotaped interrogations was conceptualized and initiated by a reformist 
minister, but the policy-making process was controlled by former and 
current members of the criminal justice establishment who were supported 
by academics working closely with them.  The result was a combination of 
a very limited reform based on the initial conception and other unanticipated 
policies which would provide new or expanded weapons for the criminal 
justice establishment. 
 
Interrogation videotaping has not yet been officially introduced, so 
determining how it will be implemented must wait until 2019.  Formal 
evaluation of the system must also wait until that time.  However, police 
and prosecutors have been videotaping interrogations on an experimental 
basis.65  At least one of these cases serves as a warning that videotaping 
alone may not bring about the effects desired by practicing attorneys and 
progressive scholars.  That is because police and prosecutors may 
interrogate suspects on a “voluntary” basis before arresting them. 66  
Videotaping will not be required for “voluntary” interrogations, and crucial 
confessions can be obtained through such “voluntary” interrogations.  
Furthermore, such “voluntary” interrogations can be conducted on an 
arrested and detained suspect if the arrest and detention were made on a 
separate charge: interrogations regarding one charge can be “voluntary” 
interrogations where no videotaping is required if the suspect has been 
                                                                                                                                                 
2015, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/07/national/crime-legal/lower-house-oks-recording-of-suspect-
questioning. 
65  The Supreme Prosecutor’s Office reported that prosecutors videotaped interrogations in 1325 
cases that were eligible to be tried as lay-judge trials from April to September 2016. Kensatsu no “kashika” 
zōka [Prosecutors’ “Transparency” Increasing], ASAHI SHINBUN, Feb. 1, 2017, evening, at 10.  The 
National Police Agency reported that police had videotaped all the interrogations after arrest in 72.8% of 
cases which might have been tried by lay judge trials in 2016. Zenkatei kashika 72.8% ni zō:  keisatsu 
torishirabe 19-nen no gimuka hikae [Transparency of the Entire Process Increased to 72.8%: Ahead of 
Becoming Mandatory for Police Interrogations in 2019], ASAHI SHINBUN, May 25, 2017, evening, at 11. 
66  See SETSUO MIYAZAWA, supra note 38, at 16–18. 
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arrested and detained on a separate charge.  Therefore, videotaping does 
not necessarily ensure the recording of crucial moments in the interrogation. 
 
The case in point is called the Imaichi Case, in which a 33-year-old 
Taiwanese immigrant was convicted for the kidnapping and murder of a 
7-year-old girl. 67   Specifically, the Imaichi Case presents three key 
problems with the procedures for videotaping interrogations: 
 
(1) videotaping of interrogations will not be required if the suspect 
has not been arrested and detained for the given charge; 
videotaping of interrogations will not be required even when the 
suspect has been arrested and detained if the basis for the arrest 
and detention is a separate charge; 
 
(2) the interrogation of a suspect arrested for a minor offense outside 
the jurisdiction of lay judge trials will not be recorded, although 
the suspect can give a confession for another, more serious 
offense in such interrogations;68 
 
(3) a video of an interrogation and confession can be used as evidence 
of a lack of coercion and may also serve as substantive evidence 
of the guilt of the defendant. 
 
The Imaichi Case is discussed in detail in the following section based 
partly on our observation of the trial.69 
 
B. The Imaichi Case as a Touchstone 
1. What is the Imaichi Case? 
On December 1, 2005, a 7-year-old girl (“V”) went missing in 
Imaichi City (now Nikko City) in Tochigi Prefecture, which is located 
northeast of Tokyo.  The next day, her body was discovered in the woods 
in the nearby Ibaraki Prefecture.  She had been stabbed to death.  V was 
                                                 
67    A Case for Recording All Interrogations, JAPAN TIMES, April 4, 2016, https://www. 
japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/04/13/editorials/case-recording-interrogations.  
68  It is estimated that videotaping will be required in only 2–3% of criminal cases. See MASAYUKI 
SUO, supra note 54. It means that videotaping will not be required in 97–98% of criminal cases. 
69 See Mari Hirayama, Imaichi-Jiken Saiban-in Saiban wa Shikinseki to Narietaka - Bochoki wo 
Motoni Ikutsukano Keijitetsuzuki jono Juyona Kadai wo Ronjiru [Can the Imaichi Case Lay Judge Trial 
Become a Touchstone Case - Discussing Some Significant Issues in the Criminal Procedure through Trial 
Observations], 739 HOGAKU SEMINA 1, 1–5 (2016). 
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last seen on her way home from school.  Witnesses reported seeing a 
suspicious white vehicle near the time and place where V was last seen.70 
 
Tochigi Prefectural Police and Ibaraki Prefectural Police jointly 
established investigation headquarters and launched an investigation.  
Though the two prefectural police forces mobilized a total of more than 
160,000 officers for the investigation and investigated 24,000 possible 
suspects,71 they did not make any arrests.  The case received a great deal 
of publicity, and the police placed posters with V’s picture requesting 
information in local police stations. 
 
On January 29, 2014, more than eight years after V’s murder, a man 
in his early thirties (“X”) was arrested in Tochigi for possession of fake 
handbags with intent to sell, a violation of the trademark law.  The Tochigi 
Prefectural Police had been conducting an undercover investigation of X as 
a suspect in V’s murder for two years.  It was clear that the real intention 
behind X’s arrest was not to prosecute him for possessing the fake handbags, 
but to get him to confess to the unsolved murder.72  X had been a suspect in 
V’s murder because he drove a white vehicle that matched the description of 
the suspicious vehicle reported by witnesses near the last place where V had 
been seen. 73   In addition, because X had graduated from the same 
elementary school that V attended, the police thought that X was probably 
familiar with the area.74  After his arrest, X was detained in the police cell 
of the Imaichi Police Station.75 
 
                                                 
70 “Imaichi jiken 1-nen” sōsa nankō: “isshun no kūhaku” toboshii jōhō [“Imaichi Case Year 1” 
Investigation Stymied: “Momentary Gap” Meager Information], YOMIURI SHINBUN, Nov. 21, 2006, 
morning, at 37.  
71 Imaichi jiken yogisha no otoko taiho [A Male Suspect is Arrested in the Imaichi Case], ASAHI 
SHIMBUN, June 4, 2014, morning. 
72  Of course, the police and prosecution denied that it was “bekken taiho” (arresting and detaining a 
suspect for a minor crime in order to interrogate a serious crime which the police and prosecutors are really 
interested in), while the defense claimed that it was “bekken taiho.” See “Jiken no nyūsu mita”: hikoku, 
higaisha to onaji shōgakkō” [“I Saw It on the News”: Defendant Graduated from Victim’s Elementary 
School], ASAHI SHINBUN (Tochigi), Mar. 18, 2016, morning, at 29. 
73  Nin’i chōshu go haisha ni: Ibaraki shō-1 satsugai yōgisha, shōko inmetsu ka [Vehicle Scrapped 
After Voluntary Interview: Suspect in Murder of Ibaraki First-Grader Could Be Destroying Evidence], 
ASAHI SHINBUN, June 5, 2014, morning, at 39. 
74  The woods where V’s body was found were secluded and not easy to access unless the killer was 
local. See id. 
75  As described earlier, in Japan, a suspect can be detained for up to twenty-three days after the arrest 
before being indicted. See MIYAZAWA, supra note 38, at 20. Ninety-eight percent of detained suspects are 
detained at police detention cells, not at detention facilities operated by the Justice Ministry. This practice of 
using police detention cells as “daiyo kangoku (substitute prisons)” has been criticized as a major cause of 
false convictions. See Ito, supra note 40. 
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According to the testimony of the prosecutor who interrogated X 
(“A”), on the morning of February 18, 2014, when X’s detention for his 
trademark violation was about to expire, X suddenly started to confess to 
V’s murder.76  According to A, when A asked, “You have murdered 
someone, haven’t you?”  X replied, “How did you find that out?”77  
However, this part of “the first confession” was not recorded by the 
prosecution.  At the trial, A testified that the very first confession was not 
videotaped because he just wanted to put out a feeler and never expected 
that X would actually start to confess.  The Prosecutor’s Office, in haste, 
started to record the rest of the interrogation, beginning that afternoon.  
However, when the prosecutor resumed the interrogation, X kept saying “I 
was panicked in the morning,” or, “I do not remember what I said in the 
morning.”  X was indicted for his violation of the trademark law on that 
day and was detained as an indicted defendant.  The police and prosecutors 
continued to interrogate X for the murder as a “voluntary interrogation” 
because X had not yet been arrested for the murder.  Most—but not 
all—interrogations by the prosecution were recorded after the very first 
“confession” on February 18th, and some of the police interrogations were 
also recorded.  There were more than 86 hours of recorded interrogation,78 
and seven hours and thirteen minutes of them were shown at the trial, based 
on the agreement between the prosecution and the defense.  In the long but 
“voluntary” interrogations shown at the trial, X often changed his statements.  
He admitted that he had kidnapped and killed V, but then he changed his 
story and said that that he had kidnapped V but had not killed her, and then 
he denied everything.79 
 
These interrogations were conducted while X was being charged with 
a violation of the trademark law.  X was finally arrested for the murder on 
June 3, 2014, and then indicted on June 24th.  The court, the prosecution, 
and the defense had met more than 20 times for pretrial meetings before the 
trial, which started almost 10 years and 4 months after the crime.80 
 
                                                 
76  Jihaku no yōsu kensatsukan shōgen: Imaichi jiken kōhan hikokunin shitsumon mo [Prosecutor 
Testifies on Circumstances of the Confession: Imaichi Case Public Trial and Defendant Questioning], 
YOMIURI SHINBUN (Tochigi), Mar. 10, 2016, morning, at 33. 
77 Tochigi sho-1 satsugai 32-sai otoko taiho [32-year-old Man is Arrested for the Murder of the 
First-grader in Tochigi], ASAHI SHIMBUN, June 4, 2014. 
78  The total sum of the hours of interrogations against X is, of course, much greater. 
79  Sadamaranu jihaku shinjitsu wa [Uncertain Confession, Where Is the Truth?], YOMIURI SHINBUN, 
Apr. 20, 2016 (Tochigi), morning, at 35. 
80  Jiken hassei kara 10-nen 4-kagetsu [10 Years and 4 Months After the Incident Occurred], 
YOMIURI SHINBUN (Tochigi), Apr. 9, 2016, morning, at 32. 
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2. The Lay Judge Trial Turned into Screen Event? 
On February 29, 2016, the lay judge trial for the Imaichi Case started 
in the Utsunomiya District Court.81  It was one of the most sensational 
trials in recent years, and 913 people lined up for the 43 seats available in 
the courtroom.  The presiding judge was female, and the two junior judges 
were male.  The lay judges were No. 1 (male, approximately 70 years old), 
No. 2 (male, approximately 30–40 years old), No. 3 (male, approximately 
30–40 years old), No. 4 (female, approximately 70 years old), No. 5 (female, 
approximately 30–40 years old), and No. 6 (female, approximately 30–40 
years old).82  Interestingly, there were five prosecutors,83 while there were 
three defense lawyers. 
 
Other than X’s confessions, most of which had been recorded, there 
was no solid evidence in the case.  The police could not find the weapon, 
and there were no witnesses at all.  Even worse, there were some 
inconsistencies between X’s confessions and the evidence on V’s body—for 
example, the nature of her wounds and the amount of blood she lost.  Even 
the forensic doctor, who examined V’s body by police order, testified that 
X’s confession did not match his understanding of how the murder was 
committed.  Other than X’s confessions, the police and the prosecution 
relied on circumstantial evidence: (1) the record of the vehicle number 
tracking system, which showed that X drove his car in the direction of the 
woods where V was found and came back the same night; (2) a cat hair 
found on V that matched the hair of X’s cat;84 and (3) an apology letter X 
wrote to his mother while he was detained, which just mentioned that he 
was “sorry for what [he had] done” and “the trouble [he] caused to [his 
mother and everyone],” which X claimed was in reference only to the 
trademark violation case.85 
 
                                                 
81 Suspect in 2005 Murder of Tochigi Girl Pleads Innocent after Initially Confessing, JAPAN 
TIMES, Feb. 29, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/29/national/crime-legal/suspect-in-2005-
murder-of-tochigi-girl-pleads-innocent-after-initially-confessing/#.V0nFKo9OKUk. 
82  These descriptions are based on observations by Professor Mari Hirayama.  
83  The victim participation system was applied in this case, and it is normal to have a larger number 
of prosecutors participate in such cases. However, assigning five prosecutors was quite unusual, even for 
cases with victim participation. This fact suggests the determination and zealousness of the prosecution to 
obtain a conviction.  
84  This hair was matched using mtDNA. Cats are divided into seventy-one groups by mtDNA. 
85  Hikoku no haha e no tegami, kōbō [Argument over Letter to Defendant’s Mother], ASAHI SHINBUN 
(Tochigi), Mar. 3, 2016, morning, at 29 (“Konkai jibun de hikiokoshita jiken de, okāsan ya minna ni 
meiwaku o kakete shimai, hontō ni gomennasai.”). 
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Given the lack of direct evidence and limited circumstantial evidence, 
the prosecution relied heavily on X’s confessions, especially the recorded 
confessions.  This trial was not the first trial in which DVDs of recorded 
confessions were played.86  However, this trial gathered the most attention 
because the crime was unresolved for nearly 9 years and because the case 
was quite rare in that, despite his confession, the defendant “completely 
denied the guilt.”87 
 
On the eighth day of the trial, March 10, 2016, the Court began to 
examine the recorded confessions in the courtroom.  It began with the 
interrogation conducted on the afternoon of February 18, 2014, the first day 
X confessed to V’s murder.  However, as previously noted, the prosecutors 
did not record the part of X’s confession in which he admitted his guilt for 
the first time.  Thus, this portion of the confession was not played.  The 
professional judges, the lay judges, the defendant, and the defense lawyers 
watched the DVD on the screen before them, and there were screens on the 
side walls for the audience in the public seats.  In the DVD, Prosecutor A 
asked X about him confessing his guilt in the morning, but, as described 
above, X replied that “I was panicked” or “I don’t remember.”  A then tried 
to confirm X’s confession by asking “whether you killed the victim or not,” 
but X replied only by groaning or sighing.88 
 
Then the interrogation conducted on February 21, 2014 was played.  
X still made ambiguous statements and told A that he had had nightmares 
after the crime.  Next, the recording of the interrogation on February 25th 
was played.  A called X a “coward,” saying, “You will be grudged by the 
bereaved family through your life.” X shouted, “I cannot take this” a few 
times, and he ran to the window and tried to jump.  The police officer 
present in the interrogation room subdued X.  When this recording was 
played at trial, the silent courtroom resounded for several minutes with X’s 
sobbing in the video.  Next, the interrogation of February 27 was played.  
                                                 
86  For an explanation of how DVDs of recorded interrogations have been treated as evidence in trials 
recently, see Kazuhiro Maruyama, Torishirabe DVD no Jissitsu Shoko-ka [DVDs of Recorded 
Interrogations Have Become Actual Evidence], 82 KIKAN KEIJI BENGO 50, 57 (2015).  
87  Unlike criminal procedure in the United States, trials are held in Japan even when the defendant 
pleads guilty, so that most criminal trials are uncontested and the only issue is sentencing. There is no “plea 
bargaining” to avoid trials in Japan. For more info on criminal procedure in Japan, see Ito, supra note 40. 
88  Torishirabe rokuon, rokuga o saisei: kenji no chōshu namanamashiku [Playing Back the Recorded 
and Videotaped Interrogation: The Prosecutor’s Vivid Questioning], ASAHI SHINBUN (Tochigi), Mar. 11, 
2016, morning, at 29 (“Kenji ‘. . . Koroshita koto dake kakuninsasete kure. Machigai nai na? Dō da?’ . . . 
Hikoku ‘Jikan kudasai.’”). 
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A asked X why he ran to the window, and X replied simply, “I thought I 
would feel better if I jumped from the window.”89 
 
On March 11, 2016, the ninth day of the trial, the prosecution played 
more of the February 27, 2014 interrogation.  Prosecutor A addressed X 
only by his first name, without any “kun” or “san,” a term usually added 
after the name in friendly conversations in Japan.  A’s tone was 
intimidating. 
 
On March 14, 2016, the tenth day of the trial, the prosecution played 
police interrogations dating from June 3rd to June 17th.  At the 
interrogation on June 3rd, X said “I am sorry” and signed a statement in the 
dossier,90 but on the night of that same day, X changed his statement and 
said, “I didn’t kill the victim.”  At the trial, X claimed that he was assaulted 
and threatened, but the three police officers who interrogated X testified that 
they did not assault or threaten X during the interrogation.91  However, 
because the police did not record all of the interrogation, and so it remained 
unclear whether X or the police told a lie. 
 
On March 15, 2016, the prosecution played a recorded interrogation 
conducted on June 11, 2014 by a different prosecutor (“B”).  The 
interrogation was conducted after X was arrested for murder.  Quite 
differently from A, B spoke with a soft voice and called X “X-kun,” an 
honorific title.  According to a newspaper article, 92  the recorded 
communication between X and B went as follows: 
 
B: X-kun, what matters here is the attitude as a human.  Can 
you say you will “live like a human?” 
 
X: I will live like a human. 
 
B: I do not want you to pretend to live like a human.  You 
must show that from your deep heart.  You must not turn 
around.  You killed V, didn’t you? 
 
                                                 
89  Id. (“Tobioritara raku da ne”) (Japanese). 
90  Statements taken at interrogations in Japan are not verbatim records. They are composed by 
interrogators and the suspect is asked to sign them.  
91  Keikan, jihaku kyōyō o hitei: “hitai no kega, jishō” [Police Officers Deny Coerced Confession: 
“Head Injury Was Self-Inflicted”], ASAHI SHINBUN, Mar. 15, 2016, morning, at 37. 
92 Saiban deno hinin nai [I Will Not Deny at the Trial], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Mar. 16, 2016. 
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X: Yes. 
 
Then X explained, with a gesture and tears, how he stabbed and killed 
V.  After he made these statements, he said, “Thank you.  I am 
relieved.”93  X even said to B, “If we had met in a different situation, we 
would be friends.”94 
 
Contrasting the interrogations of X by A with those by B might 
clearly indicate the strategy of “Good Cop versus Bad Cop.”  In fact, at the 
trial, X claimed that the reason why he cooperated with B was that he didn’t 
want to be disliked by B.  The defense lawyer also argued that the X’s 
confession to B was made under the influence of intimidating interrogation 
by A and the police officers.95 
 
The Court, however, granted the voluntariness of the confessions 
made to A on the 14th day of the trial, March 18, 2016.96  Under Article 
6-2 (2) of the Act on Criminal Trials with the Participation of Saiban-in, the 
voluntariness of confessions is deliberated and decided only by professional 
judges even in lay judge trials.  On the day of the verdict, April 8, 2017,97 
the court granted the reliability of the confessions made to B, found X guilty, 
and sentenced him to an indefinite imprisonment.98 
 
A review of the judgment document99 suggested that the Court 
placed a high value on the recorded confession to B.  On the one hand, the 
Court clearly denied the value of the circumstantial evidence stated above, 
and clearly stated that the inferences from that circumstantial evidence were 
limited.100  On the other hand, the Court recognized the reliability of the 
                                                 
93 Id. 
94 At the closing argument, the prosecutor mentioned this remark by the defendant.  
95 See “I Saw It on the News”: Defendant, Victim from Same Elementary School, supra note 72.  
96 Noguchi Reiko, Tochigi, kyū-Imaichi-shi no shō-1 joji satsugai: jihaku chōsho saiyō rokuon, 
rokuga, kimete ni “rieki yūdō” mitomezu [Murder of a First-Grade Girl in the Former City of Imaichi, 
Tochigi: Confession Records Admitted into Evidence, Recording and Videotaping Were the Decisive Factor, 
“Influence Peddling” Denied], MAINICHI SHINBUN, Mar. 18, 2016, evening, at 15. 
97 The verdict date was originally scheduled for March 31, 2016. However, at the last minute, the 
Utsunomiya District Court decided to postpone the verdict for one week. Such a postponement is very 
unusual, especially in lay judge trials, as courts normally are reluctant to disturb lay judges’ daily schedules. 
It seemed that both the professional judges and the lay judges in this case had experienced difficulty in 
deciding the verdict.  
98 Toboshii busshō semerareta handan [Under Pressure to Make a Decision with Scant Physical 
Evidence], ASAHI SHINBUN, Apr. 9, 2016, morning, at 35. 
99 Utsunomiya [Dist. Court], April 8, 2016, Heisei 28 no. 245, LEXDB 25542682, 
https://lex.lawlibrary.jp/ [hereinafter LEXDB 25542682]. LEXDB is an online legal database in Japan. 
100 Id. 
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confessions by explaining that “X’s confessions to B are not contradicted 
with objective fact”101 and that “X’s confessions are concrete and include 
many elements which are difficult to tell unless X himself had experienced 
them.”102  These statements demonstrate that, in making its decision, the 
Court heavily relied on the recorded interrogations.  Reviewing comments 
by lay judges given at the press conference after the verdict, the bigger 
problem appears to be that the lay judges considered not the dossiers, but the 
recorded interrogations as “substantial evidence” to decide the verdict. 
 
3. Recorded Interrogation: Supplementary Evidence or 
Substantial Evidence? 
 
Recording interrogations has been a goal for defense lawyers and 
many liberal legal scholars.103  On the other hand, the police and the 
prosecution have not supported those movements.  This is primarily 
because they thought recording interrogations would make it difficult to 
interrogate suspects effectively.  The lay judge system has changed the 
attitudes of prosecutors.  In 2012, the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office 
established the Task Force on Suspect Interrogations in a New Era (“Task 
Force”) (Aratana Jidai niokeru Torishirabe no Arikata Kento Chiimu).104  
In May 2013, the Task Force concluded that recorded interrogations would 
be useful to prove cases and encouraged district prosecutor’s offices to 
consider using recorded interrogations not as “supplementary evidence” but 
as “substantial evidence.”105  Since then, prosecutors have become more 
receptive to recording their interrogations.  It seems they realized that 
recorded interrogations would be their new weapons. 
 
So, what is the difference between “substantial evidence” and 
“supplementary evidence”?  Why does it matter?  Most defense lawyers 
                                                 
101 The court was referring to the examined evidence regarding V’s body. 
102 LEXDB 25542682, supra note 99. 
103 The JFBA had published a proposal, “Recording Interrogation Act Draft,” in 2003. Proposal, 
Japan Federation of Bar Associations, Proposed Legislation for Interrogation Recordings (Dec. 4, 2003), 
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/special_theme/data/kashika_rippouan.pdf. Since then, its realization 
has been one of the most important issues for the JFBA. See Makoto Ibusuki, Higisha Torishirabe Rokuga 
Seido no Saizensen: Kashika wo Meguru Ho to Shokagaku [The Cutting Edge of the Suspect Interview 
Recording: Approaches from Law and Empirical Sciences], in HORITSU BUNKA-SHA 332–33 (2016). 
104 See SUPREME PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, Audio/Video Recording of Interrogations by Public 
Prosecutors and Related Future Policies, MINISTRY JUST., http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000102283.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2017). 
105 Torishirabe kashika: Saikōken “kashika wa yūkō” hanzai risshō ni katsuyō teigen [Recording 
Interrogations: Supreme Prosecutor’s Office “Recording is Effective” Recommends Utilizing it for Proving 
Crimes], MAINICHI SHINBUN, May 5, 2013, morning, at 1. 
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and liberal legal scholars expected recorded interrogations to be used only 
as “supplementary evidence” to prove the voluntariness and the reliability of 
confessions.106  They assumed that the primary evidence to be examined at 
trial would still be the dossiers, not the recordings. 
 
However, if one values recorded interrogations as more “objective” 
and “precise” records of interrogations than dossiers, one would expect that 
recorded interrogations could be used as “substantial evidence” of a crime.  
Newspaper articles reporting comments by the lay judges at the press 
conference after the Imaichi decision indicate that these lay judges agreed 
with this perspective.  They said: “We could see X’s facial expressions and 
gestures well, which played a big part for our decision,” “Since we did not 
have a conclusive evidence, the recorded DVD made us to decide,” and, 
“Unlike dossiers, the DVDs had good presence.  I think playing DVDs at 
the trial is significant for lay judges to decide”;107 “There wasn’t any 
definitive evidence, but we reached our verdict because of the recordings (of 
the confession)”;108 “Without DVDs, I had not decided.  They (DVDs) 
have played a large role” and “I am not sure what the verdict would be 
(without the DVDs).”109  And one alternative lay judge commented: “What 
[the defendant] said on video was different from what he said in court, so 
our task was to determine which was true.”110 
 
It’s quite clear that the lay judges saw the recorded interrogations as 
substantial evidence.  The defense team seemed to have understood the 
potential impact of the DVDs at trial, but at the same time, it did not seem to 
have considered it seriously enough.  At the pretrial procedure, the defense 
team argued against playing the DVDs at the trial in front of lay judges, 
while the prosecution argued that they would present the DVDs as 
“substantial evidence” because they knew the impact they were likely to 
have on the lay judges.  The Court then decided to examine the DVDs not 
as “substantial evidence,” but as “supplementary evidence” at the trial.  It 
                                                 
106 See Takayuki Aoki, Torishirabe wo Rokuon-Rokugashita Kiroku Baitai no Jisshitsu Shoko Riyo 
[Utilizing Recorded Media of Interrogations as Actual Evidence], 31 KEIO HOGAKU 63 (2015). 
107 Jyoji satugai jiken: hikoku ni muki choeki [The Girl Murder Case: The Defendant Was Sentenced 
to the Life Sentence with a Possibility of Parole], NHK, Apr. 8, 2016, 
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/shutoken-news/20160408/4097412.html. 
108 Recorded Confession Decisive Factor in Tochigi Child Murder Case Conviction, MAINICHI, Apr. 9 
2016, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160409/p2a/00m/0na/008000c. 
109 Torishirabe eizo handan ni eikyo: Saiban-in ra kaiken [Recorded Interrogations Have Impacted 
the Decisions: Press Conference by Lay Judges], SHIMOTSUKE SHIMBUN, Apr. 9, 2016, at 2. 
110 “Kanashimi owaranai”: izoku nao kuyashisa [“The Sadness Does Not End”: Victim’s Family Still 
Frustrated], YOMIURI SHINBUN, Apr. 9, 2016, morning, at 39 (“Eizō de itte iru koto to, hōtei de itte iru koto 
ga chigau no de, dochira ga tadashii ka o mikiwameru sagyō datta”). 
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seems that the defense team did not refuse strongly enough to stop the 
DVDs from being played at trial, as they also thought that the showing of 
the interrogation by A, the intimidating prosecutor, played into their strategy 
to claim X’s confession was not voluntary.111 
 
The problem here is that the lay judges (and possibly the professional 
judges) heavily relied on what they saw on the DVDs to decide the 
verdict.112  The overconfidence in videos or DVDs as “objective” because 
“everybody sees the same thing in DVDs” is obvious here.  The lay judges 
seemed to have convicted X based on the recorded interrogations even 
though the police and prosecution did not record the whole process of the 
interrogations and presented only partial recordings at trial.  The defense 
team failed to sufficiently anticipate the powerful influence of partial 
recordings and partial showings.  A genie is released!  Although initially 
conceived by defense lawyers and liberal scholars as a method for 
protecting defendants from threatening interrogations, videotaping 
interrogations has actually become a powerful weapon for the police and the 
prosecution. 
 
4. Implications of the Imaichi Case for the Eventual 
Evaluation of the Videotaping of Interrogations 
 
The Imaichi case involved all three problems mentioned at the end of 
the preceding section.  To repeat, they are: 
 
(1) videotaping of interrogations will not be required if the suspect 
has not been arrested and detained for the given charge; 
videotaping of interrogations will not be required even when the 
suspect has been arrested and detained if the basis for the arrest 
and detention is a separate charge; 
 
(2) the interrogation of a suspect arrested for a minor offense outside 
the jurisdiction of lay judge trials will not be recorded, although 
                                                 
111 See Mari Hirayama, Imaichi Jiken Saiban-in Saiban ni okeru Higisha Torishirabe Rokuon-Rokuga 
Eizo no Inpakuto - Keiji Saiban no Riariti [The Impacts by the Recorded Interrogations at the Imaichi Case 
Lay Judge Trial – The Reality of Criminal Trials], in THE LEGAL PROCESS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: A 
FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR SETSUO MIYAZAWA’S 70TH BIRTHDAY 198 (Keiichi Ageishi et al. 
eds., 2017). 
112 Shinichiro Koike, Imaichi Hanketsu wo Ukete: Bubun Kashika Hoan no Mondaiten [The Imaichi 
Case Verdict: Problems in Partial Recording of Interrogations], 507 HO TO MINSHUSHUGI (2016). 
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the suspect can give a confession for another, more serious 
offense in such interrogations; 
 
(3) a video of an interrogation and confession can be used as 
evidence of a lack of coercion and may also serve as substantive 
evidence of the guilt of the defendant. 
 
The system for videotaping interrogations which will be introduced in 
Japan by June 2019 will also involve problems one and two, while the third 
may be a fundamental problem common to any system of recording 
interrogations.  Evaluation of the system to be introduced in 2019 would 
clearly depend on the position of the evaluators in relation to the criminal 
justice establishment. 
 
Those who belong to, or are close to, the criminal justice 
establishment would welcome the third, while they would still want to 
prevent the introduction of videotaping, even if it has limitations like one 
and two.  However, given that such a limited form of videotaping will be 
introduced in exchange for a greatly expanded wiretapping system and the 
introduction of plea bargaining, the overall reform package would be 
considered a success by members of the criminal justice establishment. 
 
Alternatively, those who conceived of and initiated the introduction 
of videotaping interrogations as a powerful reform to the criminal 
investigation system in Japan, which had long been criticized for 
“hostage-taking justice,” will now face an extremely serious dilemma: if 
they reject the introduced system of mandatory videotaping for its 
ineffectiveness, the investigation system will simply return to the old system 
of “hostage-taking justice.”  In lieu of the very limited and ineffective 
mandatory videotaping, those reformers outside the criminal justice 
establishment may want to introduce far more progressive reforms, such as 
requiring defense attorney to be present at interrogations.  However, given 
the structure of the policy-making process dominated by members of the 
criminal justice establishment, such reform is highly unlikely.  It would 
seem, then, that their only option is to adapt to the new reality. 
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III. CONCLUSION: EXPANDING FEELEY’S FRAMEWORK 
 
Malcolm M. Feeley examined cases of criminal justice reform in the 
United States, where reforms can be conceived and initiated in a very open 
structure, but implementation of the introduced reforms can be handed over 
to highly fragmented implementers.  The story of the mandatory 
videotaping of interrogations and accompanying changes in Japan shows the 
reform process at the other end of the scale, where the members of the 
criminal justice establishment who were the targets for reform can exert a 
strong influence even at the conception and initiation stages, and have even 
stronger control at the implementation and routinization stages.  We 
believe that Feeley’s theoretical framework can be expanded and made 
more generally applicable to court reforms outside the United States.  This 
could be achieved by introducing a degree of openness in the policy-making 
process at the conception and initiation stages, while also introducing the 
degree of fragmentation in the policy making process at the implementation 
and routinization stages as central independent variables which determine 
the course of the reform. 
 
